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TOWN OF GREECE AND CITY OF SAGUENAY:
NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES WITH OR
WITHOUT AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
DONALD L. BESCHLE*
1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the United States Supreme Court first considered
the scope of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,' the
relationship between non-establishment principles and the Free.Exercise Clause has been a sourceof controversy. Are the clauses capable of consistent application? Are they inevitably in tension, if not in
conflict? If non-establishment principles and free exercise principles
come into conflict in a particular case, should one always prevail?
And is it always evident in a particular case whether it presents an
establishment or a free exercise issue? 2
A survey of constitutional protection of religion in western
democracies shows protection for the freedom of religion and conscience is widespread, but explicit prohibitions. on government establishments of religion are rare.3 One would expect that a constitution that expressly includes a non-establishment principle would be

* Professor, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. Fordham University; J.D. New
York University School of Law; LL.M. Temple University School of Law.
1 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) is the first Supreme Court case to
discuss the scope of the clause.
2 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (excluding students enrolled in programs preparing for ministry from Washington State Scholarship program is
permissible to allow the state to pursue non-establishment values).
3 See Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectivesor Freedom of Conscience and Religion in
the Jurisprudenceof ConstitutionalCourts, 2001 BYU L. REv. 467, 489 (2001).
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more vigilant in protecting Jefferson's "wall of separation"4 than one
with no such provision. But an examination of non-establishment
cases in the United States Supreme Court and similar cases in the
Supreme Court of Canada seems to contradict this logical conclusion.
Canadian cases demonstrate that free exercise principles alone demand at least a degree of enforced separation between religion and
government.
A pair of cases presenting quite similar situations where local government bodies opened each legislative session with a spoken
prayer, one in the United States Supreme Court,5 the other in Canada, 6 presents a striking contrast. The Canadian Court, using freedom
of religion analysis, in the absence of an establishment clause, requires a greater degree of non-establishment restraint on government than placed by the United States Supreme Court applying an
express Establishment Clause. Might this suggest that, paradoxically,
regarding the Establishment Clause as something standing alone and
apart from free exercise principles actually leads to underenforcement of non-establishment principles?
II. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE CASES

A. Town of Greece v. Galloway
The town of Greece, New York is a community of 94,000 adjacent to the city of Rochester.7 Prior to 1999, the monthly meeting
of the town board, at which the board conducted business and was
open to being addressed by citizens, was opened with a moment of
silence.8 In 1999, the newly elected supervisor decided to open
meetings with a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer

4

The phrase originated in THOMAS

DANBURY BAPTIST AssOcIATION

JEFFERSON, LETTER TO A COMMITTEE OF THE

(Jan. 1, 1802). The phrase was invoked by Justice

Black in Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
5
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. _ (2014); 134 S. Ct. 1811.
6Mouvement Laique Qubb6cois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015]2 S.C.R.
3 (Can.).
7 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816.
8

Id.

20161

NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES

345

delivered by a local clergyman who was-designated as "chaplain of
the month." 9
From 1999 to 2007, all of the invited chaplains were Chris0
tian.' Their invocations ranged from rather generic theism to specifically Christian references." In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, who often attended town board meetings, brought suit in
federal court, claiming that the town's invocation practice was a violation of the Establishment Clause.12 They did not seek a complete
end to invocations, but rather that invocations be limited to "inclusive and ecumenical prayer."13
Relying on Marsh v. Chambers,14 the 1983 decision of the Supreme Court permitting prayer by a legislative chaplain in the Nebraska legislature, the district court dismissed the complaint. 5 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals later reversed.' 6 Applying the "nonendorsement" test forged by Justice O'Connor, which considered
whether a government practice conveys a message of endorsement
of a religious message, the court found that the "steady drumbeat of
Christian prayer," combined with a failure to actively seek out nonChristian chaplains, "ensured a Christian viewpoint" and did violate
the non-endorsement standard. 7
While the case progressed, the town invited a Jewish layman
and the chairman of a local Baha'i temple to deliver invocations, and
granted a request from. a Wiccan priestess to do the same. 8 The
great majority of invocations, however, continued to be delivered by
9 Id.
Id.
11 Id. ("Greece neither reviewed the prayers in advance of the meetings nor provided guidance as to their tone or content.").
12 Id. at 1817.
13 Id
14 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding Nebraska Legislature's
practice of opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a state-paid chaplain).
1s Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 241-43 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
16 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012).
17 Id. at 30-32. The non-endorsement test was set forth and applied by Justice
O'Connor in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
18 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1817.
10
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Christian clergy. 19 Although this limited outreach was intended to
strengthen the town's legal position, it seems to have had little, if
any, effect on the Justices of the Supreme Court.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion relied primarily on the
Court's decision in Marsh.20 To Justice Kennedy, Marsh was significant not merely for its narrow holding concerning legislative prayer,
but also for the proposition that a long historical acceptance of a
practice could outweigh the conclusion that such a practice might fail
any of the Court's suggested modern analytical approaches to Estab21
lishment cases.
Drawing on the language of Marsh and the history of specifically Christian invocations in early Congressional history,22 Justice
Kennedy rejected the argument that permissible legislative prayer
must be nonsectarian.2 3 The only limitation that the Court would
place on the prayers was that they not "denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion."4 Although the town need not make "an effort to achieve religious balancing, 2 5 the opinion at least strongly suggests that the town may not
discriminate against a representative of any religion who comes
forward wishing to deliver an invocation.

Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[N]early all of the prayers given reflected
a single denomination.").
20 Id. at 1817-28 (citing Marsh fourteen times, with County ofAllegheny coming
in second with eight citations) (majority opinion).
21 Justice Kennedy dismisses the non-endorsement test as dictum, id at 1821,
and maintains that the prayer creates no constitutional problems under a noncoercion test, since dissenters would be free to enter or leave without standing
out as disrespectful, id. at 1828. To Justice Kennedy, this distinguishes legislative prayer from prayer at public high school graduations, which, writing for the
Court, he found psychologically coercive and therefore unconstitutional. Id.; Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
22 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct at 1820.
23 Id. ("The decidedly Christian nature of these [Congressional] prayers must
not be dismissed as the relic of a time when our Nation was less pluralistic than
it is today.").
24 Id. at 1823-24 (finding that only a "course and practice over'time" of such invocations would raise constitutional problems; an occasional disparagement of
religious dissenters would not be sufficient).
25
Id. at 1824.
19
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The dissenting Justices did not challenge Marsh itself, nor did
they call for an outright ban on prayer by local legislative bodies. Justice Kagan distinguished Marsh by pointing to the fact that the local
town board meetings included ordinary citizens as participants as
well as observers.2 6 When dealing with citizen requests, the town
board is acting more like a court vis-A-vis the request, and just as it
would be improper to begin a court session with a sectarian prayer,
so also here a citizen whose religious (or non-religious) convictions
are inconsistent with those reflected in the invocation will legitimately feel alienated from her government. 27
This difference, Justice Kagan and her dissenting colleagues
concluded, requires that local legislative prayer be permitted only
where the town has taken steps not only to include representatives
of non-majority views in the roster of "chaplain of the month," but
also to see that the invocations themselves are nonsectarian and inclusive.28
B. Movement Laique Quebec6is v. Saguenay (City)
The city of Saguenay, Quebec, was founded in 2002 by the
consolidation of seven smaller municipalities. 29 The regular meetings
of the Saguenay municipal council, open to the public, are held in the
borough hall of three of the seven communities that comprise Saguenay. 30 At the start of each public council meeting, the mayor would
deliver a prayer. The short body of the prayer made no specific denominational references, but the prayer began and ended with the
mayor reciting (in French), "In the name of the Father, the Son and
the Holy Spirit," while making the sign of the cross.

Alain Simoneau, an atheist Saguenay resident who regularly
attended council meetings, asked the mayor to stop the practice of
26

Id. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1844-45.
28 Id. at 1850 ("[T]he government must take especial care to ensure that
the
prayers [citizens] hear will seek to include, rather than serve to divide.").
29 Mouvement LaYque Qubb6cois v. City of Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2
S.C.R. 3, para. 5 (Can.).
3 Id at para. 6.
31
/d. at para. 6-7.
27
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the invocation. 32 The mayor refused, and Simoneau brought his complaint to the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal, which found that the
City's by-law calling for prayer was inconsistent with the Quebec
Charter of Rights, as it protected Simoneau's freedom of conscience
and religion.3 3 The purpose of the by-law was, in the Tribunal's view,
entirely religious and inconsistent with the government's duty of religious neutrality. 34
The City successfully appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal.35 The court found that the prayer, as an invocation of universal
values, did not violate the duty of neutrality, and in addition, Simoneau's injury, if any, was trivial and insubstantial. The Supreme
Court of Canada allowed Simoneau's appeal, and invalidated the
City's prayer practices. 37 In an opinion sharply in contrast to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Town of Greece, Justice Gascon, writing for a unanimous Court, held that "consciously adhering
to certain religious beliefs to the exclusion of all others . . . [breaches] the state's duty of neutrality" and interferes with Simoneau's
freedom of conscience and religion.
Both the Quebec Charter39 and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" contain provisions that guarantee freedom of
conscience and freedom of religion. In contrast to the United States
Constitution, neither of these Charters contains an-express equivalent of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Although Justice
Gascon noted that neither the Quebec nor the Canadian Charter contains an express requirement of government neutrality on matters of
religion, such a "duty results from an evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion." 4 1 This interpretation leads to the
Id. at para. 8.
Id. at para.14-17.
34
Id at para. 16.
as Id. at para. 18-22.
36 Id. at para. 21.
37 Id. at para. 150.
38
Id. at para. 4.
39 Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, C.Q.L.R. C-12 § 3 (Can.).
32
33

Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c. 11, s. 2 http://canlii.ca/t/dsx#sec2.
41 Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 71.
40
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conclusion that the state must maintain a neutrality that "requires
that the state neither favour nor hinder any particular belief, and the
same holds true for non-belief." 4 2
In its resolution calling for the maintenance of the public
prayer, the Saguenay Council members had asserted their own rights
of religious expression. But Justice Gascon declared that "[w]hen the
state adheres to a belief, it is not merely expressing an opinion on
the subject. It is creating a hierarchy of beliefs and casting doubt on
the value of those it does not share. It is also ranking the individuals
who hold such beliefs."43
The Court of Appeal had found the prayer practice consistent
with what it termed "benevolent neutrality," which was sufficient
because the neutrality requirement should not be interpreted to require "complete secularity" by government." Justice Gascon denied
that complete secularity was at issue, but rather maintained that
true neutrality required that the state "neither encourage nor discourage" religion, and that such encouragement violates Charter
principles regardless of whether the religious practice is done "under the guise of cultural or historical reality or heritage. 45
In analyzing the City's prayer practices under this requirement of neutrality, Justice Gascon began with a two-part test, which
closely resembles the first two parts of the Lemon test used by the
United States Supreme Court in Establishment Clause cases." First,
"[a] provision of a statute, of regulations or of a by-law will be inoperative if its purpose is religious. 4 7 The second step is to examine
42

Id. at para. 72.

Id. at para. 73 (quoting R. Moon, Freedom of Religion Under the Charter of
Rights: The Limits of State Neutrality, 45 U.B.C. L. REV. 497, 507 (2012) ("If religion is an aspect of an individual's identity, then when the state treats his or her
religious practices or beliefs as less important or less true than the practices of
others, or when it marginalizes his or her religious community in some way, it
is not simply rejecting the individual's views and values, it is denying his or her
equal worth.").
44 Id. at para. 77.
45 Id. at para. 78.
46 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (finding that Establishment Clause is
violated if government practice lacks secular purpose, has primarily religious
effect, or entangles government with religion).
47
Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 44, para. 81.
43
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the effect of the practice. Here, the analysis diverges from Lemon to
some extent. The second prong of the Lemon test asks whether the
"primary effect" of the government action is religious or secular.4 8
With the neutrality requirement of the Quebec and Canadian Charters being grounded in the rights of the individual, the question is
whether the state practice has "the effect of interfering with the individual's freedom of conscience and religion, that is, impeding the individual's ability to act in accordance with his or her beliefs" in a
non-trivial way. 4 9

Both the Quebec and the Canadian Charters provide that a
provision of a statute or regulation that interferes with a range of individual rights, including the right to freedom of conscience or religion, may be justified under a proportionality test. Section 1 of the
Canadian Charter states that an infringement may be allowed if the
state can show that it is a reasonable limit in a free and democratic
society.50 Although the language of the analogous provision of the
Quebec Charter is not precisely the same, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the analysis of each of these provisions is the
same.51

The analysis for determining whether a limit on freedom of
conscience or religion can be justified consists of the following steps:
(1) that the legislative objective is of sufficient
importance, in the sense that it relates to pressing and substantial concerns, and (2) that the
means chosen to achieve the objective are proportional. The second requirement has three
components: (i) the means chosen must be rationally connected to the objective; (ii) they
must impair the right in question as little as
possible; and (iii) they must not so severely
48

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 45 para. 85.
50 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), section 1.
s Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms, C.Q.L.R. C-12 § 9.1 provides: "In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper
regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Quebec."
49
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trench on individual or group rights that the objective is outweighed by the seriousness of the
intrusion. 52
Although some of the language of this test, particularly that of (2)(ii);
seems to resemble the United States Supreme Court's strict scrutiny
test,53 its application has been somewhat more deferential to government than strict scrutiny, at least in its classic form, has been.54
Justice Gascon's opinion focused on the religious nature of the prayer
practice, dismissing the City's arguments that these were secular justifications. 55 In the absence of an important legislative objective, little
attention would need to be paid to the rest of the proportionality
test.
The City argued that a non-denominational prayer did not
qualify as an improper religious practice.56 Although the Court noted
that the prayer was quite distinctly Roman Catholic, even assuming
that it was non-denominational would not change its religious nature.57 By excluding agnostics and atheists, the practice interfered
with liberty of conscience.
The City claimed that it was merely honoring tradition,59 Justice Gascon dismissed this claim, however, noting that the practice
dated only from 2002.6 Further, the Court noted that while the state
has legitimate ability to celebrate and preserve its religious heritage,
this does not justify the use of public power to actually profess a
municipality's "own faith.>6 1

52

Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 47 para. 90.
ss Under strict scrutiny, a law will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose. See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54 See generally ROBERT J. SHARPE & KENT ROACH, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMs 68-87 (4th ed. 2009).
55
Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 49-51 paras. 96-102.
56 Id. at para. 95. The City argued that objecting to non-denominational
prayer
would "give atheism and agnosticism precedence over religion." Id
7Id. at para. 135-140.
ss Id. at para. 92.
59
1d. at para. 98.
60
1d.
61 Id. at para. 116.
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Just as the town of Greece analogized its practice to the invocations delivered by Senate and House of Representatives chaplains,
and sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in Marsh,6 2 Saguenay pointed to the practice of an opening prayer by the Speaker of
the Canadian House of Commons. 6 3 But unlike the United States Supreme Court in Town of Greece, Justice Gascon did not find the analogy persuasive.
The context of the two prayers, Justice Gascon notes, are different." Although he did not elaborate on this point, this may be the
difference noted by the dissenters in Town of Greece between local
and state or congressional legislative prayer.65 At the local event, citizens are at least potential, if not actual, participants, rather than
passive observers." This makes religious messages that send a message of non-inclusion to non-members of the legislative body more
significant. Additionally, Justice Gascon noted that the House of
Commons prayer may be protected from judicial interference by parliamentary privilege, making it sui generis and not comparable to local government bodies. 67
Finally, Saguenay pointed to the preamble of the Canadian
Charter, which declares that "Canada is founded upon principles that
recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law,"6 to argue that a
theistic prayer requiring the same supremacy could not violate the
Charter. 69 But the Court held that the general statement of the "political theory" underlying the provisions of the Charter could not serve
to limit the express individual rights protections of the Charter."
Thus, Justice Gascon concluded that the original tribunal's findings
were justified, and that the Court of Appeal erred in overturning
them: "The prayer creates a distinction, exclusion and preference
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 65-66, paras. 141-143.
64 Id. at para. 142.
65 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S.
- (2014); 134 S. Ct. 1811,
1842-45 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66
See id. at 1824, 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting.).
67
Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 66, para. 142.
68 Id. at para. 145.
69 Id. at para. 144.
70 Id. at para. 147.
62

63
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based on religion that has the effect of impairing Mr. Simoneau's
right to full and equal exercise of his freedom of conscience and religion."7 1
III. NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES: WITH OR WITHOUT AN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Town of Greece and City of Saguenay present a paradox.
Faced with very similar cases challenging prayer at the outset of official business meetings of local legislative bodies, the United States
Supreme Court, interpreting a Constitution containing an express
prohibition on establishment of religion, found the practice unobjectionable, while the Supreme Court of Canada, in the absence of any
such provision in either the Quebec or Canadian Charters, found the
practice unconstitutional as a violation of the freedom of conscience
or religion of non-believers.
To what extent is the neutrality principle at the heart of nonestablishment dependent on an express separationist provision in a
state's constitutional documents? Might it be better to conceive of
the neutrality/non-establishment principle as a corollary of individual freedom of religion rather than an independent limit on government? Does the presence of an express non-establishment clause require limits on government beyond the neutrality implicit in the
provisions protecting freedom of religion?
The twentieth century gave rise to widespread recognition of
the obligation of governments to respect religious freedom. After
World War I, the Covenant of the League of Nations required states
that had been granted mandates to govern territories and prepare
them for self-governance guarantee freedom of conscience and reli72
gion. After World War II, the United Nations adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, including Article 18:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
Id at para. 15O.
See generally NATHAN LERNER, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 7984 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte eds. 1996).
71

72
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change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.73
In 1981, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.74 The Declaration begins with these
provisions:
Article I
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of
his choice, and freedom, either individually or in
community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice, and.teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would
impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his
choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
Article 2
1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any
State, institution, or group of persons, or person on
the grounds of religion or other belief.75

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. GAOR, at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948), Art. 18.
74 Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36t Session (1981).
7 Id. at arts. 1-2.
7
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Of course, not all nations have adhered to these principles, but for
our purposes, a focus on those that do will be sufficient. The European Convention on Human Rights adopts, almost word for word, the
conscience and religious provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and also provides a mechanism for citizens to bring
claims of violation of those rights before the European Court of Human Rights.7 6 In Kokkinakis v. Greece,77 the European Court held that
a criminal conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for illegal proselytizing
was a violation of the Convention.78 Additionally, in Darby v. Sweden,79 the Court held that a non-member of the established Swedish
Lutheran Church was entitled to an exemption from a tax that supported that Church, at least to the extent that the tax supported specifically religious rather than broadly charitable activity.80
Notably, however, the European Court has never suggested
that a government may never privilege an established faith. None of
the international conventions noted above expressly prohibit establishment or insist upon strict neutrality on religious questions. Although the constitutions of some European nations expressly declare
the separation of church and state,8' or at least government neutrality as between religions, 82 other states have formally established

See T. JEREMY GUNN, AdjudicatingRights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, at 305-360 (1996).
77 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1993).
78 Darby v. Sweden, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1990); GUNN, supra note 76, at
316-25.
79 The European Commission, the body that initially evaluates complaints under
the European Convention on Human Rights, found that Article 9 was violated by
the requirement that a dissenter pay a tax earmarked for a specifically religious
activity. Upon review, the Court agreed that the tax on Dr. Darby was improper,
but based its ruling on the fact that he was denied an exemption from the tax
because he was only a part-time resident of Sweden, while full-time residents
were entitled to claim exemption as dissenters. See GUNN, supra note 76, at 31618.
80
Id.
81 See, e.g., CONSTITUCICAO DA REPUBLICA PORTEGUESA 1982, art. 41(4) (Port.); LA
CONSTITUTION, 1958, ar. 1 (Fr.).
76

82 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND,

1957, Art 44.722.
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churches, or at least recognize one religion as having a unique place
in the nation's history and culture."
The European Court has not challenged government financial
support to religion. In Darby, the Court did not criticize Sweden's
system insofar as it taxed members of the established church for that
church's support.8 Some have noted that the European Court and
Commission grant more deference not only to established churches,
but also to members of "mainstream" religions, as opposed to new or
non-traditional faiths."
Thus, in the view of the European Court, individual rights of
religious freedom do not necessarily imply government neutrality
among religions, or government neutrality between religion and irreligion. When the dissenting Evangelical Lutheran Church in Sweden challenged mandatory religious education in Swedish public
schools conducted under the auspices of the established Swedish Lutheran Church, the European Commission negotiated a settlement
granting Evangelical Lutherans an exemption.86 When an atheist
sought a similar exemption from the same law, the Commission dismissed the claim as "manifestly ill-founded."87
This cautious application of religious freedom principles, affirming individual freedom claims while not objecting to unequal
state treatment of religions, is likely a consequence of an international body exerting restraint in framing rules that will bind different
a3 See, e.g., KATAETATIKO [CONSTITUTION], 1975, art. 3 (Greece) (establishing the
Eastern Orthodox Church); NORGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION], 1814, art. 16 (Nor.)

(establishing the Evangelical Lutheran Church); Act of Supremacy 1 Eliz., c. 1
(1558) (establishing the Church of England).
84 GUNN, supra note 76, at 312 (quoting Darby v. Sweden, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sec.
A) (1990)) ("[A] State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate
Article 9 of the Convention. In fact, such a system exists in several Contracting
States and existed there already when the Convention was drafted and when
they became parties to it.").
85 Gunn found that, with only two exceptions, "the European Commission always denied applications from religions that could be called 'new', 'minority', or
'nontraditional."' GUNN, supra note 76, at 311.
86 Karnell v. Sweden, 1971 Y.B. Eur. Cony. On H.R. 676 (Eur. Comm'n H.R.).
87 Angelini v. Sweden, App. No. 10941/883, 51 Eur. Comm. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41,
49 (1987). Karnell,Angelini and other cases rejecting claims made by adherents
to minority religions are discussed by GUNN, supra note 76 at 311-12.
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societies with different histories concerning the relationship of
church and state. This is consistent with the general principle that
the European Court will respect a "margin of appreciation" for particular national history and culture in adjudicating rights claims. 88

'

But some western democracies, with or without specific constitutional provisions mandating separation or neutrality, have been
more sensitive to the relationship between non-establishment principles and individual rights. Canada provides a clear example.
As a British colony, Canada was familiar with the formal religious establishment practiced in the United Kingdom. But the religious diversity caused by the Francophile and largely Roman Catholic Quebec, a single denomination establishment was not a practical
89
option. Instead, Canadian constitutionalism from the Constitution
Act of 1867 through the middle of the twentieth century was largely
devoted to negotiating the degree to which dominant religious majorities-Catholics in Quebec or Protestants in other provincesneeded to respect minority religious rights in matters such as education and marriage.9 Although some respect was given to Protestant
or Catholic minorities, rights of non-Christian minorities received
much less attention.9
Canada inherited the British doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, and the original Canadian constitutional documents did not
empower courts to overturn legislative decisions as violative of individual rights.92 Thus, when the widespread movement among westG. DANCHIN & LISA FORMAN, The Evolving Jurisprudenceof
the European Courtof Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in
88 See generally PETER

PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

192-99

(Peter G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole, eds.)(2002).
89 See generally JANET Epp BUCKINGHAM, FIGHTING OVER GOD: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CANADA, 7-18 (2014).
90
Id at 32-69 (education issues); id. at 151-64 (marriage and divorce).
91 Id. at 13 ("[Tlhe dominance of Roman Catholic-Protestant conflict overshadowed consideration of the rights of religious minorities."). After the cultural
changes in Quebec during the post-World War II era, that led to far less influence by the Catholic Church in government and social norms, referred to as the
"Quiet Revolution," self-definition by Canadians became less focused on the
Catholic-Protestant divide and more on English-French language differences. Id.
at 18-19.
92
See SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 54, at 4-5.
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ern democracies toward recognition of individual rights following
World War II came to Canada, it initially resulted in legislation at
both the national and provincial levels recognizing rights, including
the right of religious freedom.93 Finally, after years of pressure for
the adoption of a bill of rights with constitutional status, the incorporation of a charter of rights became a priority when the government
of Prime Minister Trudeau embarked on the task of constitutional
revision in 1980.94
Thus, the first thirty-four sections of the Constitution Act of
1982 comprise the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 9 Canada's first
constitutionally entrenched individual rights protections. The list of
protected rights is largely, but not entirely, similar to those protected by the-United States Constitution.96 Section 1 of the Charter expressly provides for a form of judicial balancing in interpreting the
scope of the enumerated rights, making it clear that rights are not
absolute.9 7 This section provides that Charter rights are guaranteed,
"subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 9 8
Section 2 of the Charter deals with the same subject matter
as the First Amendment of the United States, but with some textual
differences:
93

Id. at 12-18.

94 See DAVID MILNE, THE NEW CANADIAN CONSTITUTION

23-46 (1982).

9s Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada Act, Part I of the Constitution Act, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 c. 11 (U.K.). As a consequence
of its history as a British colony, until the 1982 changes to the Canadian Constitution (the Canada Act), constitutional changes needed to be approved by the
former colonial power. See JEREMY WEBBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 26-29 (2015).
96 For example, the Charter contains no equivalent of the Second Amendment
right to bear arms, nor does it contain a "Takings Clause." Section 7 of the Charter, which comes closest to the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, "provides that life, liberty and security of the person" (omitting "property") may not be taken away "except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice." Canada Act, 1982, § 7. But Section 26, in language reminiscent of the Ninth Amendment, states that "[t]he guarantee in this Charter of
certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of
any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada." Id. at § 26.
9
1Id. at § 1.
98
Id.
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Everyone has the following freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
"
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media
of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association. 9
Subsections (b), (c) and (d) deal, in somewhat more detail, with the
same freedoms as the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment. The treatment of religion in subsection (a), however, has significant differences from the First Amendment religion clauses. In
keeping with national and international documents from the postWorld War II era, a protection is extended to "conscience" as well as
"religion." This would seem to greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the
need for courts to determine when a belief system qualifies as a religion,100 and would presumably bring non-theists and atheists within
the scope of its protection.
A difference of perhaps greater significance is the absence of
any express provision barring government establishment of religion.
How significant is this omission in differentiating the scope of religious freedom in the United States and Canada? A reasonable hypothesis might posit that Canadian courts would be more tolerant of
government practices that promote religion. Yet, from the first significant Canadian decisions interpreting Section 2(a), concerns that
American lawyers would label as "Establishment Clause matters"
were evident and dealt with in a way that demonstrated a commitment to non-establishment values at least as strong as their United
States counterparts.
The first significant decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
interpreting the Charter's guarantee of freedom of conscience and
religion was R v. Big M Drug Mart.10 Big M, charged with selling
goods on Sunday in violation of the Lord's Day Act, challenged that
99

Id. at § 2.

1oo United States courts frequently must address the definition of "religion." See
Donald L. Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Narrow Definition
of "Religion"?,39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357 (2012).
101 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.).
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Act as a violation of Section 2(a). 1 2 Chief Justice Dickson analyzed
the case in terms that would fit into an Establishment Clause case in
the United States. Initially, the Chief Justice found it significant that
the Lord's Day Act had the purpose of promoting Sunday worship,
rather than the secular purpose of simply providing a uniform day of
rest.103
In focusing on the effect of the Act, Chief Justice Dickson discussed the meaning of "freedom of religion" under the Charter. He
saw both equal treatment and non-coercion as essential aspects of
the guarantee:
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a course,
of action or inaction which he would not otherwise
have chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and
he cannot be said to be truly free . . . . Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as
direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain
of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit alternative courses of
conduct available to others. 1
The presence or absence of coercion has been decisive in United
States Establishment Clause cases, at least in the opinion of several
Justices. 05 Those who use the term do not necessarily agree on its
meaning, however. To Justice Scalia, coercion is present only when
the state imposes a tangible punishment on those who fail to con-

102 R.S.C. 1970 c. L-13. With some exceptions, the Act prohibited commercial activity on Sunday. See Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 301-02.
103 "Its religious purpose, in compelling sabbatical observance, has been longestablished and consistently maintained . . . ." Big M Drug Mart; [1985] 1 S.C.R.
at 331.
104 Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 336-37.
1os See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), discussed infi-a at notes 106107. See also Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989). Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and dissenting in part, contends that religious holiday
displays are noncoercive and therefore constitutional. Id. at 659-67.
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form. 10 Justice Kennedy, in contrast, recognizes the possibility that

psychological pressure can also qualify as coercion. 10 7 Chief Justice
Dickson's view of coercion clearly adopts Justice Kennedy's view. In
finding the Lord's Day Act to be coercive, the Chief Justice described
its effect in terms that seem less concerned with coercion and more
with results that are reminiscent of the endorsement of religion
found to be a First Amendment violation under the "nonendorsement" test first enunciated by Justice O'Connor108 in United
States cases:
To the extent that it binds all to a sectarian
Christian ideal, the Lord's Day Act works a form
of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter
and the dignity of all non-Christians. In proclaiming the standards of the Christian faith, the
Act creates a climate hostile to, and gives the
appearance of discrimination against, nonChristian Canadians .... The theological content
of the legislation remains as a subtle and constant reminder to religious minorities within the
country of their differences with, and alienation
from, the dominant religious culture. 1
The Attorney General of Alberta, defending the Lord's Day Act,
stressed the absence of any establishment clause in the Charter, and
contended that this omission meant that no statute that did not actually impede an individual's religious exercise could violate Section
2(a). 110 Chief Justice Dickson rejected this argument, noting that "es-

106

See Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The coercion that was a hall-

mark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threatofpenalty.").
107 Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (majority opinion) (noting that the Establishment Clause
may protect against "subtle coercive pressure.").
108 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[The] more direct important infringement [of the Establishment Clause] is
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a
message to . . . adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the politi-

cal community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.").
109 Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 337.
11 0 Id. at 339.
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tablishment" and "free exercise" "are not two totally separate and
distinct categories."11 ' Dickson continued, "[N]either 'free exercise'
nor 'anti-establishment' is a homogeneous category; each contains a
broad spectrum of heterogeneous principles."ll 2
Big M did not require the invalidation of all Sunday closing
laws. This became evident shortly after the Big M decision, when the
Supreme Court of Canada refused to invalidate the Ontario Retail
Business Holidays Act.113 The Act prohibited retail business on "holidays," defined as including Sundays and a number of additional holi1 4
The
days, some but not all of which were of religious significance.H
Sunday
on
Act also contained an exemption from the prohibition
business for small retailers who were closed on the preceding Saturday.' 15
Applying the analysis of religious purpose and discriminatory effect enunciated in Big M, the Court found these statutory differences significant.11 6 The more broad definition of "holidays" established a fundamentally secular purpose, and the exemptions
minimized any negative effect on the religious freedom of those who
recognized a-day other than Sunday as a day of rest.' 17 The lasting effect of the decision was minimal, however. In 1993, the Ontario legislature amended the Act to permit retailing on Sunday, while retaining the mandate of closing on a list of specific holidays, some but not
all with religious significance. 18
School closings for holiday observance have been challenged
in both Canadian and American courts,11 9 with mixed results. The
111Id. at 339-40.
112

Id. at 340.

R. v. Edwards Books and Arts, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (Can.) (upholding the
Retail Business Holidays Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 453 (Can.)).
114 Edwards Books, [1986] 2 S.C.R. at 716-17.
115
Id.
116 Id. at 741-44.
113

11 7

18

Id.
See BUCKINGHAM, supra note 89, at 139.

See e.g., Islamic School Federation v. Ottawa School Board, [1997] 99 O.A.C.
127, 145 D.L.R. 4th 659 (Can., Ont. Div. Ct.) (holding that it was not a violation of
the Charter to close schools for Christmas and Easter, but not for Islamic holidays); Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding statewide closings in Illinois of public schools on Good Friday unconstitutional); Commack v.
119
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Ontario Divisional Court upheld school closings for Christmas and
Easter holidays, on the grounds that the holidays have become "secular holidays or common pause days"1 2 0 rather than simply religious
observations. Applying the First Amendment to a similar challenge
concerning the closure of public schools in Hawaii for a long Easter
weekend, the district court found that the long history of such a closure has turned observance into a "spring [weekend]," one with secular overtones. 12 1
No question involving church-state relations in the United
States has caused more controversy than the issue of prayer in public schools. 122 Unsurprisingly, this issue has arisen in Canada as well.
Section 28(1) of Regulation 262, issued under Ontario's Education
Act, provided that the public elementary school day would begin
with the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and a Scripture reading.12 3
Although parents could request exemptions from.the recitation for
their children, the parents of children attending Sudbury public
schools sought a ruling that the regulation was invalid as a violation
of Section 2(a).124 The parents maintained that the peer pressure on
their children not to exempt themselves made the right to seek exemptions largely illusory.1 25
Despite the absence of a non-establishment principle in the
Charter, the Ontario Court of Appeal sustained the challenge, in an
analysis largely similar to that used by the United States courts in Establishment Clause cases involving school prayer:
The three appellants chose not to seek an exemption from religious exercises because of
Waibee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that public school closings on
Good Friday are not a violation of the Establishment Clause).
120 Islamic School Federation,145 D.L.R. 4th at 661.
121 Commack, 932 F.2d at 778. But see Metzl, 57 F.3d 618 (employing a contrary
analysis of a similar Illinois requirement).
122 See, e.g., Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating
state mandated Bible recitation in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (invalidating the practice of beginning the public school day with organized prayer).
123 Education Act, R.S.O. 1980 c. 129 (Can); R.R.O. Req. 262 s. 78(1) (Can.).
124 Zylberberg v. Sudbury Bd. Of Education, [1988] 52 D.L.R. 4th 577 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
125 Id. at 591.
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their concern about differentiating their children from other pupils. The peer pressure and
the classroom norms to which children are
acutely sensitive, in our opinion, are real and
pervasive and operate to compel members of religious minorities to conform with majority religious practices. 12 6
Dissenting Judge Lacourciere argued that the right to seek exemption eliminated the coercive element of the program and distinguished the case from Big M.1 2 7 In addition, Judge Lacourciere objected to the court's application of an analysis similar to earlier United
States cases, specifically calling attention to the absence of an establishment clause in the Canadian Constitution.128 The majority was not
convinced, however, that the Canadian Constitution calls for "a
bridge between church and state rather than a wall of separation." 29
Similarly, in 1990, the Ontario Court of Appeal invalidated a
program of religious education in Ontario public schools.1 3 0 The program originally focused entirely on Christianity, but in recent years
had added references to other religions. 13 1As was the case with
school prayer, parents could seek exemptions for their children.132
Ontario defended the program as a way of promoting character, eth126

Id.

Judge Lacourciere wrote:
In contrast to the legislation impugned in Big M, it is
clear that s. 28 does not seek to compel participation in
exercise with a religious component by all public school
children. I agree that indirect forms of coercion may result in a Charter violation, but whatever may be the indirect effect of the regulation, it cannot reasonably be
suggested that its purpose is to compel participation in
these exercises when the exemption is cast in such
broad terms.
Id. at 604 (Lacourciere, J., dissenting).
1 28
Id. at 608 (Lacouriere, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 609 (Lacourciere, J., dissenting).
130 Canadian Civil Liberties Ass'n. v. Ontario (Minister of Education), [1990] 65
D.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. Ont. CA.).
131 Id. at 7-8.
132 Id. at 6-8.
127
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ics, and moral values, but the court concluded that the purpose and
effect of the program was to promote Christian beliefs as normative.1 33
Although the public school cases could easily fit into the
mainstream of United States Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
one aspect of Canadian church-state law involving schools is clearly
distinct from the American model. This is the question of direct public funding of religious schools. The close connection between religion, language and culture that has been so much a part of Canada's
attempt to unite English and French speaking communities, while allowing them to retain their own identities has led to some specific
constitutional choices that require less of a separationist position on
aid to religious schools. 134 Section 93 of Canada's original constitutional document, the Constitution Act of 1867, grants exclusive control of education to the provincial governments, and also preserves
the rights and privileges of denominational schools existing by virtue
of statutes in effect at that time.' 35 In 1928, it was held that Section
93 gave the provinces broad authority to determine the degree of
public funding of religious schools.1 36 In 1984, however, after enactment of the Charter, when the government of Ontario sought to expand public funding for Catholic schools beyond grade 10 to include
all secondary school grades, the enactment was challenged as a violation of both Section 2(a) and the principle of equal treatment found
in Section 15(1).137
The Canadian Supreme Court did not disagree that standing
alone, the Charter provisions would seem to prohibit provincial aid
to religious schools, but went on to hold that the Charter was not in-

133

Id. at 28-39. The program was still heavily weighted toward Christianity. In

addition, material on non-Christian religions was primarily historical and descriptive, while discussion of Christianity included much more on theory and
belief. Id.
134
See generally, BUCKINGHAM, supra note 89, at 3-31.
13s Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 93 (U.K.).
For a discussion of the history of disputes concerning § 93, see BUCKINGHAM,
supra note 89, at 38-45.
137 In re An Act to Amend the Education Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (Can. Ont.).
136
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tended to override Section 93 of the Constitution Act of 1867.13s The
express provisions of Section 93 create a clear contrast on this issue
between Canadian and American church-state jurisprudence. 139 In
this instance, as we might expect, the constitutional system that expressly provides for non-establishment is more restrictive on government aid. The implication of the Canadian Supreme Court's reasoning, however, is clear that without the express authority given to
the provinces by Section 93, the aid to Catholic schools would be
constitutionally problematic.
The most factually similar precedent in Canadian appellate
courts to City of Saguenay was decided in 1999 by the Ontario Court
of Appeal.'4 The mayor and council of the town of Penetanguishene
opened each council meeting with a recitation of the Lord's Prayer.141
Foreshadowing the decision in City of Saguenay, the court held that
the practice infringed the religious freedom of non-Christian residents who wanted to attend the open meeting.142
The court found it "clear that the purpose of the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer at the opening of council meetings is to impose a
Christian moral tone on the deliberations of council." 43 The town argued that this was quite different than the-school prayer at issue in
Zylberberg, in that adults would feel no more than a trivial degree of
coercive peer pressure. 1" The court responded that while children
may be more vulnerable, the adults, "[j]ust as children[,] are entitled
to attend public schools and be free of coercion or pressure to conform to the religious practices of the majority, so everyone is entitled

Id. at 1196 ("The Charter cannot be applied so as to abrogate or derogate
from rights or privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution.").
139 See generally Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the EstablishmentClause, 42 WM & MARY
L. REv. 771 (2001)-(providing an overview of the United States Supreme Court's
history dealing with government aid to religious schools).
140 Freitag v. Town of Penetanguishene, [1999] 179 D.L.R. 4th 150 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
141Id. at 157.
142 Id. at 162.
143 Id. at 157.
144
Id. at 162.
138
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to attend public local council meetings and to enjoy the same freedom."1 45
The court was unimpressed with the argument that
longstanding tradition should insulate the prayer from constitutional
scrutiny. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in the United States
Supreme Court decision in Marsh'4 was cited to emphasize that
changing times and attitudes can transform a practice once offensive
to no one, but later "highly offensive to many persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike."1 4 7 The court, however, did suggest
that a brief non-sectarian prayer might be a constitutionally acceptable alternative to the identifiably Christian Lord's Prayer.
When we review the Canadian cases under the Charter that
most closely resemble disputes that the United States would analyze
as Establishment Clause cases, we can see an interesting pattern.
Putting aside the question of government aid to religious schools, an
issue specifically dealt with by the Constitution Act of 1867 in a way
untouched by the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada has reached
decisions that are at least as respectful of what Americans would
classify as non-establishment principles as United States decisions.
And in the specific case of legislative prayer at the level of local government, the Canadian Supreme Court has been more sensitive to
these principles. And this is so despite the absence of any analog of
the First Amendment Establishment Clause in the Charter or any
other provision of Canada's constitution. What can we learn from the
Canadian Supreme Court's focus on the threat to individual religious
freedom posed by government support for religion that might be
helpful in clarifying United States First Amendment jurisprudence?
IV. NON-ESTABLISHMENT: A SEPARATE PRINCIPLE OR A NECESSARY ASPECT
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM?

Some would dismiss an inquiry into what insights foreign
court interpretations of their own constitutional provisions might
145 Id.

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795-822 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Freitag, [1999] 179 D.L.R. 4th at 165 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 817 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
146
147
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provide for American courts as they interpret United States constitutional law. 148 Although courts of other common law nations frequently draw on American cases for persuasive authority in cases involving individual rights, it has been extremely rare to find the United
States Supreme Court citing foreign law. 14 9 While occasional separate
opinions from a Justice might suggest that other nations' experiences
might "cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem,"15 0 the Court's prevailing position,
as most clearly articulated by Justice Scalia, has been that comparative constitutional analysis is helpful only when drafting, rather than
interpreting, a constitution.is5
Certainly, where a foreign constitution reflects a basic choice
of values inconsistent with the United States Constitution, comparative analysis makes little sense. Where foreign law is equally committed to common values, a different picture emerges. A commitment to religious freedom has become a widely accepted
international norm, one embraced by all western democracies. The
scope of this freedom has evolved, both in the United States, where
nineteenth century mere toleration of religious minorities has grown
to, at least, equal treatment of all faiths, and in other nations, even
those where a formal establishment still exists. 15 2 This would suggest
that the scope of religious freedom, and its relationship to non-

This position is most closely associated with Justice Scalia. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (maintaining that a comparative analysis with
other countries may be relevant in writing a constitution, but not in interpreting one).
149 See, e.g., R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639 ("[It is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to American constitutional jurisprudence in
seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charterguarantees that have counterparts
in the United States Constitution"). But at the same time, courts "[s]hould be
wary of drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different
countries, in different ages." Id.
1so See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1
s1 See In re An Act to Amend the Education Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (Can. Ont.).
152 See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text For the evolution of churchstate law in nineteenth century United States at the state level, prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states, see STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND
DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURYAMERICA (2010).
148
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establishment principles, is a subject on which foreign law may provide helpful insight.
The presence of two separate First Amendment clauses dealing with religion has led to significant difficulty in interpretation. On
the surface, there seems to be a degree of conflict between the Establishment Clause, which suggests that government disregard religion
in its decisions, and the Free Exercise Clause, which suggests that
sensitivity to religion is sometimes required. For judges and others
analyzing constitutional claims involving religion, the presence of
two clauses would seem to require an initial decision of whether a
case essentially presents an establishment or a free exercise issue.
While different tests have emerged for analysis of problems arising
under each clause, it should be obvious that any case involving government and religion presents concerns touching the values behind
each clause.
In some cases, the coexistence of non-establishment and free
exercise values is obvious and discussed explicitly by courts. In Locke
v. Davey,153 for example, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the
State of Washington's rule disallowing participation in a state program of merit scholarships by those pursuing a college-level program preparing the student for the ministry. 154 The majority of the
Court permitted Washington to pursue non-establishment values by
15
refusing to fund preparation for ministry,s
while the dissenters saw
this as state discrimination against religion, essentially the type of
state action infringing free exercise values.156 From the earliest days
of Establishment Clause cases, defenders of state practices, such as
government aid to religiously affiliated schools, or the presence of
prayer in public schools, have defended the programs as no more
than attempts to eliminate discrimination against religious institutions,157 or recognition of believers' free exercise rights within a pub-

153

540 U.S. 712 (2004).

154

Id. at 715.

1ss Id. at 719-25.
156

Id. at 726-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("[W]e must be
careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established
churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from ex157
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lic forum.158 Similarly, opponents of religiously based exemptions

from legal obligations have characterized them as improper government favoritism, implicating non-establishment values.5 9
The overlap of Establishment Clause and free exercise values
may explain recent trends in the Supreme Court's application of each
clause. Establishment Clause cases have moved in a more accommodationist direction, both in contexts involving government financial
aid to religious institutions,1 6 and government symbolic support of
religion.161 At the same time, the Court's application of the Free Exercise Clause has been limited to instances of government hostility to
religion 62-a development that, implicitly at least, recognizes nonestablishment values. While the two clauses seem to converge
somewhat at the level of First Amendment analysis, the Court has
made it clear that at the state level, governments may extend free
exercise protection under their own constitutions beyond the First
Amendment limits without creating non-establishment problems,16 3

tending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their
religious belief.").
1ss See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 323 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of permitting student-led invocations at high school football games, suggesting that the Court's decision impinges on the students' free exercise rights).
159 In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Court significantly expanded the definition of "religion"
in the Selective Service Act to include belief systems beyond those professing
traditional theistic beliefs. Justice Harlan concurred, despite his view that this
was clearly contrary to legislative intent, on the ground that an exemption from
the military draft available only to members of traditionally defined religions
would create a serious Establishment Clause problem. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 35661 (Harlan, J. concurring).
160 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
16 1
See Lupu, supra note 139, at 791-72.
162 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 7 (2005).
163 Compare Emp't Div. Dep't. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (finding no free exercise exemption required from neutral statute of
general applicability), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) (requiring free exercise exemption where religion is singled out for hostile treatment).
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or, as in Locke, enforce non-establishment principles of their state
constitutions beyond the requirements of the First Amendment.16
The presence of non-establishment principles and free exercise principles in any case involving government and religion means
that a court must decide which set of principles dominates in a particular case. That decision will likely lead a court to classify a case as
an Establishment Clause or a Free Exercise Clause case, but the label
will be less significant than the degree of deference given to each
principle in the court's analysis. This allows us to see how Canadian
courts have come to interpret religious freedom as including some
degree of non-establishment, despite the absence of an establishment clause in the Canadian Charter.
If any case involving government and religion calls for some
degree of balancing principles, how much weight should be given to
each? We would expect constitutional text to be of at least some assistance here. Before discussing the significance of the existence or
absence of an express non-establishment clause, we might note a
possible significant textual difference between the scope of the religious freedom principle in the United States and Canadian Constitutions.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment expressly
protects only "religion."165 The Canadian Charter, in contrast, but in
keeping with the most common formulation in post-World War II national and international documents, protects rights of both "religion"
and "conscience." 1 6 At first glance, this suggests a broader, if not a
stronger, application of the right, under the Canadian formulation. In
addition, the broader formulation eliminates the need, not uncommon in First Amendment cases, to determine when a belief system
qualifies for protection as a religion.
In practice, however, there may be less significance to this
distinction than might appear likely. In cases interpreting the scope
of the statutory exemption of religiously-based conscientious objectors from the military draft during the Vietnam War era, the Su164

See generally Angela C. Carmella, State ConstitutionalProtection of Religious

Exercise:An Amazing Post-Smithjurisprudence,1993 BYU L. REv. 275 (1993).
165 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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preme Court broadened the scope of the concept of religion far beyond traditional boundaries.' 6 ' A "sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying"1 68 as religious would
suffice. Clearly, the line between the religious and the conscientious
was, if not eliminated, certainly blurred. Of interest for our purposes
of examining the relationship between freedom of religion and nonestablishment principles, Justice Harlan concurred in these decisions
despite skepticism on legislative intent, on the grounds that limiting
the definition to traditional forms of religion would pose a serious
Establishment Clause problem. 169
Although the draft exemption cases were matters of statutory interpretation, 1e courts in subsequent years applied similarly
broad notions of religion in a wide range of cases seeking free exercise exemptions. While the Supreme. Court has noted that purely
"personal reasons" might not qualify, and also allowed courts to examine the sincerity of the claimant's belief, in the absence of evidence of insincerity, or a belief system so outlandish as to suggest
that the claimant is merely seeking personal gain, courts have been
hesitant to reject claims of religious belief.17 1 Although Canadian
courts do not seem to have dealt with the scope of "conscience," it
would not be surprising if that concept were also subject to some
limits, such as sincerity. The Charter language more clearly protects
agnostic or atheistic belief systems, but it would seem that in practice the absence of a reference to conscience in the First Amendment
does not lead to a significant difference in the breadth of the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause and the religious freedom provision of the Canadian Charter.
167

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 2(a).

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970).
1 69 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
170 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
171 See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding transcendental
meditation as religion); Petersen v. Wilmer Commcn's, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d
1014 (2002) (finding "Creativity," a philosophy of white supremacy, as religion); Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1994) (finding Satanism as religion).
168

2016]

NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES

373

Justice Harlan's insight that a narrow definition of religion in
the draft exemption cases would raise serious Establishment Clause
questions points to one way in which the Establishment Clause
serves to limit government not in merely abstract ways, but in service of freedom of conscience. How does a government practice that
does not coerce an individual (in Justice Scalia's narrow definition of
coercion) 17 2 create a concrete, individualized injury sufficient to
grant standing to those objecting to the program? The Supreme
Court addressed this question in Flast v. Cohen,1 73 holding that the
Establishment Clause created a right to be free of government actions rising to the level of establishment. 174 The Court recognized
that denial of standing would essentially immunize, from challenge
government financial aid to religion, the most classic type of establishment activity.1 7 5 In doing so, the Court brought within the protection of the First Amendment religious dissenters, not merely those of
different faiths, but also the nonreligious. Although subsequent Supreme Court decisions have chipped away at the holding of Flast,17 6 it
remains as a reminder that the religion clauses are meant to do more
than assure equal treatment of traditional religions.
The recognition that the Establishment Clause does not
merely limit government in pursuit of some abstract principles, but
rather in the service of individual rights, can go a long way to explain
the presence of a non-establishment principle in a constitutional system without an express establishment clause, particularly one which,
like Canada's, respects freedom of conscience as well as religion. At
the same time, when Canadian courts decide cases presenting what
The most prominent of the cases in which courts refuse to recognize individual beliefs are those in which is seems clear that the religious claim was meant
to protect illegal drug use. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th
Cir. 1996); State v. Pederson, 679 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
173 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
17 4
Id. at 103-04 ("The concern of Madison and his supporters was quite clearly
that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if government could employ its taxing and spending powers to aid one religion over another and to aid
religion in general.").
175s Id.
176 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (finding no taxpayer standing to challenge
the transfer of government property to a religious college).
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United States courts would recognize as Establishment Clause cases
as religious freedom cases, and deciding them in Ways that are no
less protective of non-establishment values (and, in the case of local
legislative prayer, more protective), it should suggest that recent Establishment Clause claims in the United States Supreme Court have
leaned too far in the direction of accommodation.
The existence of two separate religion clauses in the First
Amendment may serve to mask the degree in which they are each
grounded in the protection of individual conscience. Standing alone,
the Establishment Clause can seem to be a restraint on government,
but one disconnected from any individual right. Only when a severe
instance of coercion is challenged will the function of the Clause in
protecting individual rights be recognized.
Canadian decisions, starting with Big M and including City of
Saguenay, serve to highlight the connection between religious freedom and non-establishment principles.177 By itself, the principle of
free exercise prohibits state coercion in matters of religion, and as a
corollary, insists on non-discrimination based on religion. The presence of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment, then,
should be seen as serving to emphasize the connection between nonestablishment values and individual religious freedom, rather than
the introduction of a separate principle that stands in tension with
the Free Exercise Clause.
At the very least, the contrast between City of Saguenay and
Town of Greece should suggest that non-establishment values are being under-enforced by the United States Supreme Court. To interpret
the Establishment Clause as requiring only neutrality among religions ignores the growing number of Americans who do not regard
themselves as belonging to a particular denomination, including but
not limited to atheists and agnostics.17 8 To see no Establishment
Clause problem in the absence of government coercion, in the narrow definition put forward by Justice Scalia, ignores the significance
of government endorsement of religion. The United States Supreme
Court is unlikely to begin citing foreign decisions to any significant
177 See R v. Big M Drug Mart; [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 301-02; Mouvement Laique
v. City of Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 5 (Can.).
Qubb6cois
178 See supra notes 100-116 and accompanying text.

2016]

NON-ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLES

375

extent in the near future. But where a constitutional system that, in
the absence of an express Establishment Clause leads to court decisions that seem more deferential to non-establishment values than
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it certainly provides food for thought. 9 Is it possible, however paradoxical, that a
separate Establishment Clause, by disguising the connection between non-establishment principles and free exercise rights, might
lead to less respect for non-establishment principles than would be
the case if the clause were not there?

17 See America's Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 12,
2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religiouslandscape/. The survey finds 22.8% of America's "unaffiliated" with any particular religion. Interestingly, Pew finds a similar trend in Canada, Canada'sChanging Religious Landscape, PEw RESEARCH CENTER (une 27, 2013),
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/27/canadas-changing-religiouslandscape/.

